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1. Introduction 
 
The effect of labor market regulations, and in particular, the effect of employment protection 
laws (EPL), has sparked an ongoing debate among economists. While a number of them adhere 
to the view that labor market institutions impair economic performance, others maintain that they 
can improve workers’ welfare without harming economic efficiency.
1 The empirical evidence 
available so far has not helped to settle the debate. A large body of literature assessing the impact 
of EPL on labor market variables, mostly based on the analysis of data for industrial countries, 
has led to ambiguous results.  While some studies find that employment protection regulations 
have important effects on employment adjustment, worker turnover, employment, or 
unemployment, others find no evidence of such effects.
2  At the same time, little is known about 
the effects of economic protection on value added and productivity given the few studies that 
have examined this issue.
3 
The lack of conclusive results to date may result from various factors. First, while 
theoretical models offer clear predictions regarding some of the expected effects—as in the case 
of the expected effects on turnover—they do not offer clear predictions on the expected effects 
of employment protection laws on employment or value added.  Employment protection laws 
reduce firms’ incentives to adjust labor in the event of supply or demand shocks, but they do not 
necessarily reduce average employment of existing firms (Bertola, 1990). Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993), however, argue for the importance of firm entry and exit as one important 
margin affected by the laws. In their model, calibrated to U.S. parameters, an increase in 
adjustment costs would significantly reduce employment rates as a result of a decline in (net) 
entry. The empirical literature, however, has not explored much whether there are differential 
effects in the extensive and intensive margins.
4   
Another important issue is that determining the effect of labor institutions is a difficult 
endeavor. Labor regulations change very infrequently and tend to be applied at the national level 
for all workers. From the econometrician’s point of view, this situation implies very little 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Freeman (2005) for a description of the state of this debate, as well as  Nickell (1997).  
2 See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Lazear (1990), Nickell (1997), Nickell and Layard (1999), and Organization 
for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD, 1999) for some empirical studies assessing the effects of 
employment protection and other labor policies in a sample of OECD countries.    
3 Besley and Burgess (2004) is an exception.   
4 Klapper et al. (2004), Besley and Burgess (2004) and Kugler and Pica (2005) are exceptions.    5
variation over time, across workers, or across geographic locations.
5,6 Most studies resort to 
cross-country differences in institutions and outcomes as the only existing sources of variation. 
Such estimates, however, are not sufficiently reliable.  First, most studies draw their inferences 
from a limited number of industrial countries;  the small number of countries and the insufficient 
time variation do not make it possible to control for unobserved country differences, thus greatly 
increasing the likelihood of omitted variable bias. Second, many studies fail to control for the 
likely endogeneity of regulations. It is likely, for example, that countries that experience high 
turnover rates have a high demand for strict employment protection legislation. This implies that 
cross-country estimates are likely to be upward biased, which in turn may explain the lack of 
relationship that the literature has found between these two variables.
7 Other examples of such 
endogeneity come readily to mind: countries with low employment creation or undergoing 
particularly bad shocks may tend to protect existing jobs. 
Another problem related to cross-country estimates is that they do not account for 
differences in measurement across countries, which may introduce substantial measurement error 
into the dependent variable. This is particularly relevant for job flows; in some countries data are 
measured at the firm level, while in others data are collected at the plant level. The two measures 
are not strictly comparable because firm-level data miss the reallocation that occurs within 
plants.  
In this paper, we propose a new method to estimate the economic effect of employment 
regulations that overcomes many of the problems faced by existing estimates. In addition to 
assessing the effects of EPL on employment and turnover, we also assess its effects on variables 
such as value added, productivity and number of plants, for which few estimates are available.  
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), our test exploits differences across sectors and countries to 
                                                           
5 In most countries labor regulations apply to the whole economy. Two important exceptions are: (1) countries in 
which small firms are exempted from the law or are covered by a less restrictive code; and (2) countries in which 
labor regulations vary at the state level, such as India and the United States. In the latter two countries, researchers 
have exploited geographical-time variation to relate economic outcomes to regulation (See Autor et al., 2003, for the 
United States  and  Besley and Burgess, 2004, for India). These studies found negative effects of labor regulations 
on employment. 
6 In some limited occasions reforms have applied only to some groups of workers, which allows implementing a 
difference-in-differences estimation of the effects in the treated group, relative to the non-affected group of workers. 
See Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Kugler et al. (2002) for an application of this methodology to U.S. and 
Spanish data, respectively.  
7 An exception is Caballero et al. (2004).    6
implement a difference-in-differences methodology.
8 The intuition for the test is developed in a 
simple model, which shows that sector differences in the intrinsic volatility of demand and 
supply of shocks lead to differential effects of employment protection across sectors. The model 
also predicts that EPL is more binding in more volatile sectors. This is the inference that we test 
in our empirical model.  
To identify an industry’s intrinsic demand for adjustment, we first study the rank 
correlation of industry job flows, and when available, of excess reallocation across countries, and 
we find that correlations tend to be positive, statistically significant, and large. Across countries, 
some industries exhibit higher levels of job reallocation than others. This suggests that there are 
important technological or product market characteristics that determine the relative volatility of 
employment in a sector.  Of course, observed sector reallocation is itself affected by labor market 
institutions. Yet to the extent that institutions affect only the level but not the ranking of sector 
reallocation within a country, the observed rank correlations across countries would be a good 
estimate of the true rank correlation in the absence of labor market regulations. Under this 
assumption, we identify the intrinsic relative employment volatility of an industry in a given 
country in the absence of adjustment costs by the relative job reallocation of that industry in the 
United States, which according to many measures has the least restrictive employment protection 
regulation in our sample. The next step consists in identifying whether industries that require 
higher levels of reallocation exhibit lower rates of turnover, employment, value added, or firm 
entry relative to more stable sectors in countries with more stringent job regulations.    
To implement these tests, we construct an international database at the industry level for 
the manufacturing sector. Contrary to most existing literature on employment regulation, which 
is based solely on industrial countries, our study relies on a larger sample of developed and 
developing countries. One advantage of expanding the sample to developing countries is that, 
while in industrial countries the strength of EPL and other labor market institutions may be 
highly correlated, such correlation is likely to be weaker in the developing country sample. In 
developing countries EPL is high, but trade union density and coverage are low (ILO, 1997), and 
protection against unemployment risks is much weaker than in industrial countries (World Bank, 
                                                           
8 While difference-in differences methodologies exploiting time and geographical variation are common in labor 
economics, our methodology implies exploiting sector differences across countries.  This methodology, has been 
applied applied in the finance literature.  See Claessens and Laeven (2003); Galindo et al  (2002); Galindo and 
Micco (2004), Raddatz (2002) and Rajan and Zingales (1998).   7
2004). This feature, jointly with our difference-in-differences estimation approach, reduces the 
likelihood of omitted variable bias.  
The data contain information on turnover (at the two-digit level), employment, value 
added, and number of plants for the manufacturing sector (at the two and three-digit levels). We 
complement this data with some available measures of the stringency of EPL.  Since these are de 
jure measures, which compare labor laws according to the text of the law, we also control for 
differences in the level of enforcement. The results indicate that employment protection reduces 
job flows and that this is particularly the case in industries that require a higher level of 
reallocation. We find that these effects occur within both the samples of developed and 
developing countries, but the effects are stronger in countries with better law enforcement 
(proxied by rule of law measures).  We also find that employment and value added of high-
reallocation sectors decline in relative terms. Such employment effects are entirely driven by a 
reduction in the entry of new plants in those sectors. In contrast, the average employment per 
plant is not significantly affected.  These results are very robust to changes in specification, 
sample period, countries in sample, control variables, or estimation method.     
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section motivates and describes 
the empirical framework. The third section presents the data and the methodology to identify 
sectors in which regulations are more binding. The fourth section describes the main results. The 
fifth and final section concludes.   
 
2. A Simple Theoretical Framework and Empirical Specification 
Our empirical work is based on the notion that some industries require more flexibility than 
others in adjusting their employment levels. Firms in industries that face high volatility in their 
product demand or in their technologies are likely to require more flexibility than firms in more 
stable sectors. In the textile sector, for example, the swings of fashion imply that demand for a 
certain product or material varies substantially from year to year. Therefore, regulations that 
impede adjustment are expected to be more binding in sectors that require greater flexibility.  In 
this section, we develop a simple dynamic labor demand model to illustrate this idea and to 
provide theoretical support for our empirical specification. 
   8
2.1 A Simple Model 
 
We use a simple adjustment costs model as in Calvo (1983) to describe the effect of labor 
rigidities on job reallocation, firm expected profits, number of firms in the market, and total 
employment at the industry level. First, we solve the model assuming no adjustment costs and 
then we assess how the solution of the model changes with such costs. 





1 ) , ( ijct ijct ijct L L A L A − = Π      (1) 
where Lijct represents the level of employment of firm i in sector j, country c, and period t, and 
Aijct, the profit shifter, summarizes demand and supply shocks.  For each firm, Aijct is a random 
variable with support  ] , [ A A  and cumulative distribution function Fjc(A), which is independent of 
past values.
10  
In each sector there is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants. To enter, firms 
must first pay a sunk cost Ψi, which is distributed among the continuum of potential producers 
with a continuous cumulative distribution G(.) which is assumed invariant across countries, 
sectors and time. Firms draw their initial profit parameter Aijct after they pay the entry cost but 
before they decide their initial level of employment.
11  Finally, the supply of labor is assumed to 
be infinitely elastic.  
 
2.2 No Adjustment Costs 
The desired level of employment (the static optimum) without adjustment costs is  ijct ijct A L =
*  and 
the expected present value of future profits, before the firm enters the market is given by 








jc ijct jc A E A dF L A β β − − ∫ = Π , where β is the discount rate and E(|jc) is the expectation 
operator conditional on being in sector j and country c. Firms will enter the market as long as the 
expected present value of future profits is equal or higher than the entry costs (Ψi). Under these 
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9 This profit function can be derived assuming linear demand and constant marginal cost functions. Firms are 
assumed to be price takers in the labor market.  
10  A is positive. The profit shifter Aijct may be correlated within sectors and countries: cov(Aijct , Aijct-τ)=0, but 
cov(Ahjct , Aijct)≠0 for i≠h.    9
is, the expected future profits, the number of firms in the market, and the average employment 
per plant in a given sector-country are time invariant. In addition, job reallocation in sector j, 
country c, defined as in Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) is equal to 
) | ( ) | (
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2.3 Adjustment Costs 
With adjustment costs as in Calvo (1983), entrepreneurs face an exogenous constant probability 
λ of adjusting employment in a given period. The value function for a firm with profit parameter 
Aijct and employment level Lijct is equal to: 
 
) ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) ( )
~
, ( ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + ∫ ∫ − + + Π = t jc ijct ijct t jc ijct ijct ijct ijct ijct ijct A dF L A V A dF L A V L A L A V β λ λβ  
where 1
~
+ t L denotes the dynamic optimal level of employment in t+1 given the profit parameter 
At+1. We derive the dynamic optimal level of employment using the first order conditions (FOC): 
) 1 ( ) | ( )) 1 ( 1 (
~
λ β λ β − + − − = jc ijct ijct ijct A E A L   ( 2 )  
The dynamic optimal level of employment is a weighted average between the current (Aijct) and 
expected, optimal level of employment without adjustment costs E(Aijct|jc).  Equation (2) implies 
that adjustment costs do not affect the average firm size (in terms of employment). Using these 
results, we compute sectoral job reallocation as:
13 
* )) 1 ( 1 (
) | (
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These expressions imply that job reallocation from firms with low to firms with high profits falls 
with adjustment costs (1-λ), and this decline is larger in sectors with higher volatility of demand 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 To avoid considering entry and exit of firms in steady state, we assume that once a firm exits the market it cannot 
enter again.   
12 An alternative measure of job reallocation based only on the first and second moments of A  is: 
) | (
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or supply shocks (profit shifters). Lower turnover implies a lower expected future profit for 
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Substituting expression (1) into expression (3) yields:  
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which is smaller than the expected present value of future profits without adjustment costs (first 
term). This is the result of two effects: First, adjustment costs create a wedge between the static 
and the dynamic optimal level of employment (second term in the first line). Second, firms 
cannot adjust to the dynamic optimal level of employment in each period (third term in the first 
line).
14 Thus the expected entry value decreases with the adjustment costs (1- λ), and this 
reduction increases with the intrinsic sector variance (the variance of the profit shifter). 
Therefore, under free entry, the number of operating firms declines with adjustment costs and 
this decline increases with the intrinsic variance. Using a first-order Taylor expansion, the 
reduction in the number of firms is given by  
()
( ) ) | ( ) | ( 1
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− − .   
Summing up, this simple model yields several empirical implications.  First, job reallocation 
declines with adjustment costs, and this decline increases with the intrinsic volatility of demand 
and supply shocks, which is summarized in the variability of the desired level of employment 
without adjustment costs.  Second, the reduction in turnover due to adjustment costs reduces the 
expected entry value. Under free entry, this implies a smaller number of firms operating in the 
market. This decline is higher in sectors with high intrinsic volatility.  Third, in this model the 
expected size of firms (in terms of employment) is independent of the level of adjustment costs 
(1-λ). This is because in this model there is no substitute for labor and thus an increase in 
adjustment costs does not imply a substitution between labor and other factors. Finally, since 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Alternatively, 
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adjustment costs only affect entry rates, the level of employment (and therefore output) is 
decreasing with adjustment costs, and moreso for sectors with a higher intrinsic variance of 
demand or supply shocks.  Thus our model implies that effects of employment protection 
legislation on turnover, employment, value added, and numbers of plants are relatively larger in 




2.4 Empirical Specification 
The previous section suggests that the effects of employment protection legislation are larger in 
sectors with high intrinsic variance of shocks.  Taking, for example, job reallocation (SUM), our 
simple model implies 




. c jc c jc SUM SUM SUM SUM − − − = − λ β λ   
that is, for a given size of the adjustment cost ( λ − 1 ), the higher the relative intrinsic volatility of 
sector j relative to the country average, the higher the decline in turnover in sector j relative to 
the average of other sectors.. 
   Based on this implication, our empirical approach follows the literature on difference-in-
differences to test for a differential effect of employment protection legislation in sectors that are 
inherently more volatile. This approach allows us to use country and sector fixed effects to 
control for all observable and unobservable country and sector characteristics. In particular, it 
allows us to control for differences in country and sector output volatility as well as for 
differences in the coverage and methodology of data collection across countries. This approach 
also alleviates the potential problem of endogeneity of regulations present in cross-country 
analysis. Thus, by using sector level data and controlling for country-wide volatility with country 
fixed effects we account for the feedback from employment outcomes to regulations.
16 
We exploit country-sector variation estimating the following specification:  
jc jc j c c c j j jc Z X R Y ε δ δ τ α τ α + + + + = 1 0    (3)   
where Yjc denotes an economic indicator in sector j, country c, τj and τc are sector and country 
                                                           
15 These conclusions do not depend on the assumption of temporary shocks. In Micco and Pagés (2004) we 
developed a version of this model with quadratic adjustment costs and permanent shocks with similar results for 
turnover and average employment. The entry decision was not considered in that model.  
16 To claim endogeneity, one would have to argue that across countries a high level of turnover or low job creation 
in some sectors determines the level of employment protection in the whole country.   12
fixed effects,  Zjc. is a vector of controls that vary at the country-sector level, Rc is a measure  of 
(de jure) employment protection legislation in country c, and Xj is a variable that measures the 
flexibility requirements of sector j.  
To identify intrinsic volatility, we assume that in a frictionless world the ranking of 
variability across industries would be the same across countries. Therefore, relative industry 
reallocation in countries with low adjustment costs provides a good proxy of the intrinsic 
volatility of sectors in a country up to a constant value.  The United States provides a good 
candidate for such a benchmark because its labor market is less regulated than in other countries. 
Therefore we use industry reallocation in U.S. industries to identify the frictionless level of 
reallocation, although we assess the robustness of our results to the use of different benchmarks.  
Reassuringly, while we cannot observe frictionless reallocation in countries with high regulation, 
in the next section we show that the rank correlation across countries in sector reallocation is in 
most cases positive, statistically significant and high, lending support to our identification 
strategy.
17 
Besides labor regulations, there are a number of factors that may influence the relative 
size and growth of some sectors over others. Thus, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
provide evidence that sectors that require more external financing grow faster in countries with 
higher financial development.  Following a similar methodology, Claessens and Laeven (2003) 
show that sectors that are more intensive in the use of intangible assets (such as patents, 
copyrights, or clients lists) benefit more and therefore grow faster in countries with more secure 
property rights. Finally, Klapper et al. (2004) show that sectors with a high natural rate of entry 
of new firms experience higher firm entry—and thus possibly higher employment and output 
growth—in countries with low barriers to the entry of new firms.     
While is unlikely that these effects—related to the structure of financing and asset 
portfolios of industries—are correlated with how labor regulations affect industries with various 
degrees of intrinsic volatility,  we control for these effects by adding three additional controls to 
                                                           
17 Similar identification strategies have been recently proposed in the literature. For example, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) test whether sectors with higher intrinsic dependency of external funds grow faster in countries with more 
developed financial markets. They assume that external dependence ratios in U.S. industries are a good proxy for the 
intrinsic industry external dependency ratios in all countries.  In this study we go one step further and show that 
there is a high correlation in observed job reallocation across countries.    13
our analysis.
18  The first variable follows Rajan and Zingales (1998) and interacts external 
dependency in U.S. industries (as a measure of a sector dependency on external dependency) 
with a measure of financial development at the country level. The second control variable 
follows Claessens and Laeven (2003) and interacts the ratio of intangible to fixed assets in U.S. 
industries (as a measure of a sector dependency on intangible assets) with a country-level 
indicator of property rights. Finally, following Klapper et al (2004), the third variable interacts a 
measure of the entry rate in U.S industries (as a measure of a sector intrinsic natural entry rate) 
with a measure of barriers to entry at the country level.
19 
 




This paper uses data from a large number of sources at the country and sector level of 
disaggregation. Table 1 provides information regarding the description of the variables and their 
sources. In terms of the outcome variables, we assemble data on employment, value added, and 
number of establishments from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook produced by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2002) at the two- and three-digit level of 
disaggregation in the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC-rev2). The data are 
for the manufacturing sector. For each variable, we construct five-year averages covering the 
periods 1985-90 and 1991-95, although we focus most of our analysis on the later period. Table 
2 provides summary statistics of these variables for the period 1991-95, for all countries and also 
distinguishing between industrial and developing countries.  Depending on the variables 
considered, the database covers between 65 and 69 countries, and more than half the countries 
are outside the sample of industrial countries.  
We also collect data on average annual job flows at the two-digit level for manufacturing 
industries. There is no readily available dataset on job flows that spans a large number of 
developing and developed countries.  Gathering data from diverse sources, we collect data for 11 
developed and seven Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s (see Table 2 and 
                                                           
18 The correlation between job reallocation and external financial dependence is 0.15, and with the intangibility ratio 
is 0.10. There is a slightly higher positive correlation between reallocation and entry rates  (0.25). 
19 One important institutional feature that we cannot account for in our empirical analysis is the share of workers 
under fixed-term contracts in each sector. The use of such contracts is widespread in a number of European 
countries (OECD, 1999) and the liberalization of their use is akin to a reduction in EPL (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay,   14
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix for a full description of the periods and sources of these 
data, and for job reallocation rates by country and sector, respectively). Following Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1999), job reallocation is defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction.  
Plant-level data have been used for most countries, except for Argentina, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom, where only firm-level information is available. Job reallocation due to firm entry and 
exit data are available for all countries except Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Data are 
obtained from industrial surveys, except for Brazil and Mexico, for which social security registry 
and industrial survey data are available.  Finally, for a few countries in which they are available, 
we also collect data on excess reallocation, defined as the difference between job reallocation 
and net job creation.
20 
To characterize job security across countries, we use two measures of the stringency of 
employment protection regulations as of 1997 obtained from Botero et al. (2004). The first 
measure, denominated monetary cost of dismissal (MC), measures the  cost of firing 20 percent 
of the workers (10 percent fired for redundancy and 10 percent fired without just cause). This 
cost is calculated as the sum of advance notice, severance pay, and other mandatory penalties. If 
dismissals are not allowed by law, the measure sets the costs of dismissal to the annual wage. 
The second measure, denominated administrative costs of dismissal (AC), measures 
employment protection in terms of the extent of the administrative procedures involved in 
dismissals. It is computed as  the average of the following seven dummy variables, which equal 
one if any of the following conditions occurs: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before 
dismissing more than one worker; (2) if the employer needs the approval of a third party before 
dismissing more than one worker; (3) if the employer must notify a third party before dismissing 
one redundant worker; (4) if the employer needs the approval of a third party to dismiss one 
redundant worker; (5) if the employer must provide relocation or retraining alternatives for 
redundant employees before dismissal; (6) if there are priority rules applying to dismissal or lay-
offs; and (7) if there are priority rules applying to reemployment. For the purposes of our work, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2002). This could imply that in some countries our measures of EPL overestimate the amount of employment 
protection, which in turn, implies that we may underestimate its effects.  
20 See Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). In the absence of heterogeneous job creation and destruction patterns across 
firms within sectors, excess job reallocation is zero. Instead, excess reallocation measures tend to be quite large, 
indicating that a large share of job reallocation is not driven by aggregate shocks (more than 70 percent of job 
reallocation in our sample is driven by idiosyncratic shocks). There is a high correlation between sector job 
reallocation and sector excess job reallocation (0.99).  
   15
we standardize both measures between zero and one. Given the high correlation between the two 
variables (0.71) in most specifications, we use the sum of both measures as a summary measure 
of employment protection legislation.
21 
It can be argued, however, that the stringency of the regulatory environment depends on 
the level of enforcement of the law. While direct measures of the degree of enforceability of 
labor laws do not exist, it is expected that countries with better overall rule of law are more likely 
to enforce labor laws.  We use the simple time average for period 1996-2002 of the variable 
“Rule of Law” constructed by Kauffman et al. (2003) to account for differences in law 
enforceability across countries. This indicator reflects the responses given by a large number of 
enterprises, citizens, and expert survey respondents across the world. Higher values reflect better 
rule of law.  
We construct our main variable by interacting the former country-specific regulatory 
variables with sector job reallocation (or excess job reallocation) obtained from John 
Haltiwanger’s job flows database.
22 Such variables are available at the four-digit SIC 
classification, which are easily convertible to ISIC-Rev2 classification at the two- and three-digit 
level. 
Regarding the additional control variables, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we use 
as an indicator of the financial development in a given country a measure of the reliability of 
financial reporting, or accounting standards (see Table 1 for further information on this and the 
rest of variables used in this study). We also gather an indicator of dependence on external 
financing f o r  U . S .  i n d u s t r i e s  f r o m  t h e  s a m e  a u t hors. This measure reports the fraction of 
investment in U.S. firms financed externally (to the firm) by sector of activity. We follow 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) and use their measure of intangible asset intensity, and the property 
rights indicator constructed by the Heritage Foundation.
23 We measure the cost of starting a 
                                                           
21 Since our outcome variables are measured for the early 1990s, it would be preferable to have measures reflecting 
the labor laws prevailing in the 1980s rather than in the 1990s; however, such variables are not available for a wide 
sample of countries.  It is well known, however, that labor laws do not vary much over time. Indeed, judging from 
the sample of industrial countries for which employment protection measures are available for both the late 1980s 
and the late 1990s from OECD (1999, Table 2.5),  we find that the correlation between both measures is 0.96. It is 
then highly plausible that our measures of regulation provide a good approximation of the legal environment in the 
1980s.    
22 John Haltiwanger’s data are available at http://www.econ.umd.edu/~haltiwan/download.htm 
23 The data can be downloaded from http://www.heritage.org 
 
   16
business in a given country using the cost associated with complying with the regulation of entry 
(as a percentage of the GDP per capita) constructed by Djankov et al.  (2002) and the intrinsic 
entry rate in each sector in absence of entry or labor regulations, with a measure of the entry rate 
in U.S. industries constructed by Dunne et al. (1988).  
Table 2 reports summary statistics. Employment is well diversified across sectors, with 
the average share of employment in each sector being 4 percent of total manufacturing 
employment. Not surprisingly, average value added and labor productivity are higher in the 
sample of industrial countries. Job reallocation is very similar in both sub-samples. However, 
this is partly due to the lack of entry and exit data in some of the developing countries in the 
sample (only Latin American countries for this variable). In fact, the average reallocation for all 
Latin American countries with entry and exit data is 26.37, which is higher than the average for 
industrial countries. Cross-country comparisons, however, should be treated cautiously. Besides 
the treatment of entry and exit, differences in the collection and nature of the data, in the 
definition and treatment of firm mergers, or in firm size imply that data are not strictly 
comparable. This is a standard problem in cross-country exercises, which we address using a 
differences-in-differences methodology. 
Dismissal costs (both monetary and administrative) are on average higher in the sample 
of developing countries. The lower prevalence and lower level of coverage of unemployment 
insurance may explain such differences. Yet such laws are likely to be less enforced in 
developing countries. As expected, the rule of law measure suggests higher compliance in 
industrial countries.   
In addition to labor regulation, other aspects of the business environment are more 
favorable in industrial countries. On average, industrial countries experience lower costs of 
starting a firm, more secure property rights, higher prevalence of rule of law, and better 
accounting standards.    
 
3.2 Ranking Sectors According to Flexibility Requirements 
Table 4 shows the Spearman rank correlation across pairs of countries in two-digit ISIC sector 
job reallocation. It also shows the rank correlation in job reallocation between each country and 
the simple average of job reallocation among English-speaking countries (nineteenth row) as 
well as with the simple average in our sample (twentieth row). Remarkably, the rank correlation   17
across countries is positive in all but 14 pairs, while the hypothesis of independence is rejected, 
at the 10 percent level, in only three instances. Moreover, the rank coefficients are in most cases 
very high. Focusing on the correlations with the United States (seventeenth row), the pair-wise 
rank correlations with developing and developed countries are positive and statistically 
significant in 17 out of 18 cases, and higher than 0.65 in 12 cases, respectively. The rank 
correlations between the United States and the other three English-speaking countries in our 
sample (Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), all highly deregulated countries, are 
0.85 or higher. The two countries with the lowest pair-wise correlation with the United States, 
and in general with most countries, are Finland, and Sweden.
24 
The large correlation among countries in sector job reallocation is not exclusively the 
product of common sector shocks. In fact, the rank correlation in sector excess job reallocation 
across countries is positive, large, and in most cases statistically significant (see Table 5). 
Unfortunately, such data are available only for a small sample of countries. While observed rank 
correlations are affected by labor market regulations, it is reassuring that the highest rank 
correlation values are found among countries that are relatively unregulated, such as the English-
speaking countries of our sample. The former suggests common sector shocks and also important 
commonalities in the distribution of shocks.  
 
4. Results 
In this section we assess the results of using differences in sector characteristics to implement a 
difference-in-differences estimation of the effects of employment regulations. We first assess 
whether employment protection legislation affects the level of reallocation, since this is the 
driver mechanism for the effects on the other variables identified in our model. We then assess 
whether there are any effects on employment, output, and firm entry.  We drop the United States 
from the sample in those specifications in which reallocation in U.S. industries is used as a 
measure of frictionless job reallocation by industry.   
 
                                                           
24 It is unclear why turnover patterns are different in these countries relative to the rest of the sample. One possibility 
may be that high coverage of collective bargaining alters the ranking of turnover across sectors. As of 1990, 
coverage of collective bargaining in OECD countries was the highest in Finland (95 percent). Yet,  Germany (90) 
and France (92) had higher coverage rates than Sweden (83) (OECD, 1994).   18
4.1 Job Flows and Employment Protection 
Table 6 shows the results of estimating specification (3) for job reallocation as a dependent 
variable.  The main result for job flows is presented in column (1). After controlling for country 
and sector fixed effects, we find that more intrinsically volatile industries present lower levels of 
job turnover, relative to less volatile sectors, in countries with more stringent employment 
protection laws. The sign of the coefficient on the interaction terms is negative and statistically 
significant. The row labeled differential in job reallocation at the bottom of the table shows the 
magnitude of the impact of job security on job turnover differentials across sectors and countries, 
according to our estimation.  For example, in column (1), this differential is -6.31. This number 
is interpreted as follows: job reallocation in an industry in the 90
th percentile of flexibility 
requirement relative to an industry in the 10
th percentile is 6.31 percentage points lower in a 
country with strict employment protection (that is, in the 90
th percentile of job security) than in a 
country with low employment protection (in the 10
th percentile). These are large numbers if we 
consider that the average level of job turnover in our sample is 20 percent. 
These results survive a large number of robustness tests, presented in columns (2) 
through (11) in Table 5.  For example, it could be argued that these results are driven by 
differences in sector volatility across countries with different levels of income per capita, which 
in turn are correlated with differences in regulatory levels.
25 To control for such effects, we add 
to the regression the interaction between income per capita and U.S. job reallocation. The results 
do not change (column 2). Results are also robust to measuring sector specific adjustment 
requirement using the average sectoral reallocation in the English-speaking countries in our 
sample (column 3) or excess reallocation in U.S. industries (column 4).   
The entry and exit of firms explains a large share of total labor reallocation (Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 1999).  Therefore, regulations that increase the cost of entry can also dampen labor 
reallocation. It is quite plausible that across countries the political economy that leads to the 
enactment of job security regulations also leads to the enactment of regulations on entry. If that 
is so, our estimates may be capturing the effects of other regulations.  To assess whether this is 
the case, we control for a measure of the cost of entry at the country level (as a percentage of 
GDP per capita) multiplied by the importance of firm entry in a given industry (measured by 
                                                           
25 Heckman and Pagés (2004) and Botero et al. (2004) show that the stringency of employment protection laws  
decreases with income levels.    19
percentage of firms less than two years old in U.S. industries).
26 Column (5) shows that our main 
results for job flows are unchanged if such regulations are controlled for.   
In some countries of the sample, regulations may be poorly enforced. To account for 
differences in law enforcement, we add a new control variable interacting our constructed 
regulatory variable at sector, country level with rule of law by country, while allowing for 
another interaction between reallocation by sector and rule of law, which captures differences in 
reallocation associated with differences in rule of law (but unrelated to job security regulations). 
Interestingly, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction 
between the regulatory term and rule of law, as shown in column (6). Such a negative coefficient 
indicates that the effect of employment protection laws on flows increases with rule of law.  In 
fact, the effect of EPL on job flows is not statistically significant in countries that score low on 
the rule of law measure.  
Results are also robust regardless whether manufacturing census or social security 
registry data is used for Brazil and Mexico. Results are also robust if job reallocation is measured 
in logarithms rather than in absolute terms, as shown in column (8). This implies that our results 
hold regardless of whether we assume sector intrinsic employment variability to be constant 
across countries up to a constant additive or multiplicative term. The results also hold if the data 
are split into two sub-samples for developed and developing countries, as in columns (9) through 
(11). We find that in the developing countries sample the effect is maintained in countries with 
higher values in the rule of law measure, while the effect is not statistically significant in 
countries with an ineffective rule of law.  In contrast, rule of law does not play a large role in the 
developed country sample. Nonetheless, an F test of the coefficients on labor regulations and 
regulations interacted by rule of law indicates that they are both statistically significant at the 15 
percent in the Latin American sample and at the 5 percent in the developed countries sample. 
Results are also robust to changes in the sample of countries and sectors.
27 
In sum, using a difference-in-differences methodology that controls for country, sector, 
and income effects allows us identifying sizeable and robust effects of job security on turnover. 
                                                           
26 Here, we adopt a similar procedure to labor regulations. We proxy the importance of entry in an industry in a 
given country, with the proportion of firms less than two years old in that industry in the U.S.—a relatively less 
regulated economy where firm entry regulations are less likely to distort the importance of entry across sectors. 
27 It is well known that cross-country analysis often suffers from lack of robustness. To test for this possibility, we 
re-run our baseline estimates—columns (2) and column (10) in Table 6—excluding one country and one sector at a   20
Such effects hold in industrial countries, as well as developing countries with an effective rule of 
law. It should be added that these estimates are not the result of the sample, but rather of the 
methodology used for the estimates.  A standard cross-country regression of job flows against 
regulations—controlling for GDP variability, as well as for whether the data capture entry/exit 
and whether data are collected at the plant/firm level—yields no statistically significant relation 
between these variables, as found in similar exercises in the literature.
28 Instead, our difference-
in-difference results are in line with recent estimates at the micro-level. For example, Boeri and 
Jimeno (2003) find that in Italy the dismissal probabilities of permanent workers (subject to 
EPL) increase relative to those of temporary workers (not subject to EPL) in firms that are 
exempted from EPL (below 15 employees). Kugler and Pica (2005) also measure the effects on 
job flows of a recent reform that increased the cost of dismissal only for workers in firms with 
fewer than 15 employees in Italy, and they obtain similar results.
29   
 
4.2 Results for Employment  
We now turn to examine the effect of employment protection legislation on employment. In this 
section we study sector outcomes at the three-digit ISIC level in 53 countries. We report the 
results in Table 7.  
Column (1) presents the main results, which suggest that employment regulations greatly 
reduce employment of the most affected sectors. The implied magnitude of the effects is very 
large. Increasing employment protection legislation from the 10
th least regulated percentile to the 
90
th most regulated percentile in the sample reduces employment in the 90
th  most variable sector 
relative to the 10
th  most variable sector by 54 percent.   
Our results are maintained if we re-run our baseline specification with a number of 
controls that in the literature have been found to affect the activity levels across sectors. Yet, the 
magnitude of the effects increases from 54 to 94 percent. These results suggest that increasing 
employment protection from the 10
th to the 90
th percentile in the sample wipes out employment 
in very volatile sectors.  We also find the expected signs for the controls. Thus capital market 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
time. The results, available upon request, indicate that the coefficients presented in Table 6 remain stable and 
statistically significant at conventional levels in all cases.  
28 See Micco and Pagés (2004).  
29 Yet, not all micro-level studies find such effects.  Bauer et al. (2004) explore the effects of changes in size-
threshold exemptions in Germany. They find no significant relationship between worker flows and the stringency of 
dismissal protection.     21
development allows the expansion of employment in sectors with higher dependence on external 
funds, while better property rights allow the expansion of employment in industries dependent on 
intangible assets.. In addition, we also find that higher costs of entry reduce employment growth 
in industries where entry is more important.  The results also hold if, rather than expressing the 
dependent variable in log levels, we express it as a share of employment, as seen in column (6). 
This is not surprising given that the inclusion of country dummies implies that all results for log 
levels are relative to the country average.  The results also hold if, rather than using the average 
(log) employment in the 1991-95 period, average (log) employment in the 1986–90 period is 
used; this substitution is shown in column (7).  
We find both measures of employment protection (administrative costs and monetary 
costs) to affect employment, as shown in columns (3) through (5) of Table 7. When both 
measures are included in the specification, the results indicate a stronger adverse effect for 
administrative costs than for monetary costs. In addition, while the coefficient for administrative 
costs is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, the coefficient for monetary costs is only 
significant at the 20 percent level. The explanation could be that there might be a higher pass-
through in the form of lower wages in the case of monetary costs than in the case of 
administrative costs.
30 
We find strong adverse effects of employment protection both in the sample of industrial 
and developing countries, as shown in columns (8) and (9). The coefficient on the interaction of 
rule of law is negative, suggesting that the stronger the rule of law the higher the adverse effects; 
however, the coefficient is not statistically significant, as shown in column (10).  
   We find these results to be very robust to changes in the level of aggregation of the data, 
measures of sector reallocation, control variables,  and  sample of countries and sectors. For 
example, performing the estimation with the data aggregated at the two-digit level does not alter 
our main results. Our results are also maintained if we measure intrinsic reallocation with excess 
reallocation rather than gross flows or if we eliminate one country or sector at a time.  The 
results also hold if we control for systematic differences in the distribution of employment across 
industries in countries with different levels of income. To do so, we add to our baseline 
                                                           
30 Workers may pay for higher employment protection benefits by accepting lower wages. Such a trade-off may be 
more likely when employment protection takes the form of severance payments, relative to when it takes the form of 
administrative restrictions to employment adjustment.    
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employment regression—column (2) of Table 7—sector dummies for both developing and 
developed countries, respectively or sector dummies multiplied by income per capita.  Finally, 
the results also hold if rather than using accounting standards, we measure capital market 
development by the ratio of credit to GDP.
31  
 
4.3 Results for Other Economic Outcomes 
Employment protection legislation also has a bearing on other economic outcomes.  Table 8 
reports the results of running the same baseline specification as in column (2) of Table 7 for 
value added, labor productivity, number of plants, and workers per plant (all in log average).  We 
find that more stringent employment protection regulation is associated with lower value added 
and a lower number of establishments in industries with higher intrinsic volatility.  
The results also indicate that higher employment protection is associated with a decline in 
average labor productivity and average employment per plant. These results, however—unlike 
the results for reallocation, employment, value added, and number of plants—are not robust to 
changes in the number of countries included in the sample. For example, eliminating Nigeria 
from the sample yields a positive but not statistically significant coefficient for labor 
productivity. In the case of the average firm size estimates (in terms of employment), eliminating 
either Malaysia or Portugal from the sample renders the coefficient on the labor regulations not 
statistically significant. Yet in both cases, further removing other countries or sectors one at a 
time from the sample does not change the results relative to those found excluding these outlier 
countries. Therefore, since the effects in most samples are not statistically different from zero, it 
is safer to conclude that labor regulations do not robustly alter labor productivity or the average 
employment per plant. The effect of regulations on value added reported in Table 8 also appears 
large. However, again, this effect is entirely driven by Nigeria. Once this country is removed 
from the sample, the effect of regulations on output is reduced to 60 percent: that is, increasing 
regulations from the 10
th to the 90
th percentile reduces value added in the most variable sectors 
by 60 percent. Further eliminating one sector or country at a time from the sample does not alter 
the magnitude of this estimate.  We therefore conclude that the evidence points to strong 
negative effects of employment protection on employment, value added, and number of 
                                                           
31 We used accounting standards rather than financial development because the first is a better measure of the 
development of the financial market.  However, the second measure is available for a larger number of countries.     23
establishments, and no statistically significant effects on labor productivity or average 




This paper proposes a new method for estimating the economic effect of employment 
regulations. This test is based on assessing whether regulations are more binding in industries 
that require more flexibility.  By implementing a difference-in-differences approach, we can 
control for a number of unobservable country and sector effects, which in turn reduce the omitted 
variable and endogeneity problems that weaken the credibility of estimates based on cross-
country analysis. We also include a large number of developing countries and examine the 
effects on output, productivity and net entry for which very few estimates exist. 
This paper has shown that employment protection reduces turnover, employment, and 
value added by reducing the growth of highly volatile sectors, such as leather products and 
apparel.  Our model and our estimates suggest that the decline in employment is mostly 
accounted by a decline in net entry of firms, with no discernible changes in average employment 
or output per firm. The effects are likely to go beyond the patterns of sector specialization across 
countries. By reducing the size of the most affected industries, labor regulations are likely to 
reduce firm entry, employment, and value added at the aggregate level.     24
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 Country Period Sectors Reallocation 
due to entry / 




Argentina 1991-2001 9 No Firms Sánchez and Butler (2004) (*)
Brazil (SSR) 1992-2000 8 Yes Plants Menezes-Filho coordinator (2003)  (*)
Brazil (IS) 1997-2000 9 No Plants Authors Construction 1 
Canada 1979-1988 9 Yes Plants Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) 
Chile 1991-1999 8 Yes Plants Bergoeing, Hernando & Repetto (2003) (*)
Colombia 1993-1999 9 Yes Plants Medina, Meléndez & Seim (2003) 2 (*)
Germany 1986-1989 9 Yes Plants Grey (1995)
Finland 1985-1988 9 Yes Plants Grey (1995)
France 1984-1988 9 Yes Plants Gourinchas (1999)
United Kingdom
1987-1989 9 Yes Firms Barnes & Haskel (2002)
Italy 1987-1989 9 Yes Firms Grey (1995)
Mexico (SSR) 1994-2000 9 Yes Plants Kaplan, Martínez & Robertson (2003) 
Mexico (IS) 1994-2000 9 No Plants Authors Construction 3 
Norway 1984-1986 9 Yes Plants Grey (1995)
New Zealand 1986-1989 9 Yes Plants Grey (1995)
Portugal 1992-1996 9 Yes Plants Blanchard and Portugal (2001)
Sweden 1980-1991 9 Yes Plants Grey (1995)
Uruguay 1988-1995 6 No Plants Casacuberta, Fachola & Gandelman (2003) 4 (*)
United States 1973-1993 9 Yes Plants Baldwin, Dunne and Haltiwanger (1998) 
Venezuela 1996-1999 9 No Plants Authors Construction 5
1/ Brazil (SSR) denotes  data from the social security agency (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais),and  BRA (IS) 
from the Manuf. Annual Survey (Pesquisa Industrial Anual).    2/ Due to methodology changes in 1992, we restrict the 
data to the period 1993-1999.    3/ Mexico (SSR) denotes data from the social security agency (Instituto Mexicano del 
Seguro Social). Mexico (IS) denotes data from the Manuf. Annual Survey (Encuesta Industrial INEGI.).  4/ Venezuela 
uses data from the Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial  de Venezuela – Instituto de Estadísticas de Venezuela). (*) 
Data at 2-digit available at the Job Flows Database. Inter-American Development Bank.  
http://www.iadb.org/res/pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=DBA-002  Sectors with fewer than 40 plants are not included. 
 Job Reallocation Data Sources


























ISIC (Rev 2) 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
Argentina 15.3 15.5 17.4 12.7 12.9 12.0 12.3 15.4 17.3
Brazil (SSR) 34.4 36.4 36.5 27.7 30.3 29.9 30.3 31.7 NA
Brazil (IS) 13.8 9.8 10.7 8.6 8.6 8.4 8.6 9.8 7.3
Canada 17.6 26.0 27.7 16.6 18.6 23.0 13.3 25.1 28.1
Chile 28.4 22.8 32.7 21.3 21.8 23.5 9.8 25.4 NA
Colombia 24.9 23.4 29.6 22.7 20.5 19.8 16.0 23.4 22.4
Germany 15.9 15.0 17.5 11.6 8.6 13.0 10.1 12.5 14.6
Finland 14.6 18.9 18.2 19.2 14.7 13.8 10.7 19.6 16.7
France 31.2 21.5 28.8 17.3 18.4 14.0 27.4 20.2 28.4
Italy 22.4 25.4 23.1 17.4 15.8 17.7 19.1 19.4 38.9
Mexico (SSR) 23.5 35.5 39.6 26.3 22.5 24.9 21.4 26.7 30.8
Mexico (IS) 5.9 7.9 9.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.1 8.1 6.3
Norway 14.8 17.4 15.7 11.8 12.0 14.3 7.3 18.9 16.3
New Zealand 27.3 34.3 32.7 23.8 27.4 30.9 25.1 32.3 38.3
Portugal 27.1 24.4 27.1 23.3 22.0 22.2 18.1 24.4 26.0
Sweden 24.6 21.7 24.6 20.7 20.2 26.1 32.6 22.3 19.0
Uruguay 11.9 17.6 NA 10.5 10.9 12.2 NA 15.3 NA
United Kingdom 23.0 26.2 29.8 22.2 20.0 22.3 20.9 23.9 35.6
United States 17.6 21.8 22.6 15.3 17.3 20.1 15.6 19.2 24.0
Venezuela 9.4 7.6 11.4 7.4 8.7 10.2 4.5 10.1 9.3
Average 20.2 21.4 23.9 17.1 16.9 18.2 16.3 20.2 22.3
NA: Not Available. 
 Job Reallocation per Country and Sector 
This table presents job reallocation data (SUM) by country and sector. Only sectors with 40 plants or more are included. (SSR) 
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Variable  Description and Source
Index Employment Protection 
Legislation  --Monetary Costs 
(EPLmon)
As described in Botero and others (2004). "Measures the cost of firing 20 percent of a
firm’s workers (10% are fired for redundancy and 10% without cause). The cost of firing a
worker is calculated as the sum of the notice period, severance pay, and any mandatory
penalties established by law or mandatory collective agreements for a worker with three
years of tenure with the firm. If dismissal is illegal, we set the cost of firing equal to the
annual wage. The new wage bill incorporates the normal wage of the remaining workers
and the cost of firing workers. The cost of firing workers is computed as the ratio of the
new wage bill to the old one". Source:   Botero and others (2004) 
Index Employment Protection 
Legislation  --Administrative 
Costs (EPLadm)
As described in Botero and others (2004). "Measures worker protection granted by law or
mandatory collective agreements against dismissal. It is the average of the following seven
dummy variables which equal one: (1) if the employer must notify a third party before
dismissing more than one worker; (2) if the employer needs the approval of a third party
prior to dismissing more than one worker; (3) if the employer must notify a third party
before dismissing one redundant worker; (4) if the employer needs the approval of a third
party to dismiss one redundant worker; (5) if the employer must provide relocation or
retraining alternatives for redundant employees prior to dismissal; (6) if there are priority
rules applying to dismissal or lay-offs; and (7) if there are priority rules applying to re-
employment". Source: Botero and others (2004)  
GDP per Capita (GDPpc) GDP per capita measured in Constant 1995 US dollars. Source: World Bank Development
Indicators  (WDI, 2005). 
Accounting Standards (AS) This index ranks the market disclosure in annual company reports in each country as of 
1990. A higher number indicates more disclosure. Obtained from Table 2, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)
Property Rights  (PR)  It measures the extent by which governments protect private property by enforcing laws. 
Countries are ranked from 1 to 5. The higher the protection of private property, the lower 
the score. This measure is obtained from the Heritage Foundation Web page 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/  Average 1995-2006.
Rule of Law (RL) Measures whether a country has an environment with fair and predictable rules, and the 
extent by which property rights are protected. It is based on the aggregation of measures 
based on perception of incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary and the enforceability of contracts.1996-2002. Higher values indicate better rule 
of law. Source: Governance Matters III.  Kaufmann and others ( 2003) 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/
Entry Costs  (ECgdp) Direct cost (as a fraction of GDP per capita in 1999) associated with meeting government 
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Job Reallocation in United States 
(SUM_USA)
Job reallocation defined as sum of  job creation and job destruction at 4 digit SIC code. 
Time average by sector for period 1973-1993. Source: Job Flows data Davis, Haltiwanger 
and Schuch (1996) http://www.econ.umd.edu/~haltiwan/download
Excess Job Reallocation in 
United States (EXC_USA)
This variable is defined as job reallocation minus the absolute value of net job creation.  As 
with job reallocation, we compute the time average of the annual measures. Same source 
and period as SUM_USA. 
Rate of Firm Entry (ENTRY) Mean firm entry rate computed as number of new firms between periods t-1 and t divided 
by number of firms in period t for the United States. Two-digit SIC. Source: Table 5 Dunne 
et al (1988).1963-1982.
External Financial Dependence 
(EFD)
Fraction of investments in U.S. firms financed externally during the 1980's. Three-digit 
ISIC code.  Source: Table 1, Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Intangible Intensity (IA)  1980-1989 at the two-digit SIC. Source: Claessens and Laeven (2003).
Job Reallocation (SUM)
This variable is defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction.  We construct a 
sector-country data set computing the time average of the annual measures. The data come 
from several sources. In some cases, like Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, we directly 
compute the reallocation measures based on industrial surveys or social security registries. 
For the other countries, we use data available from published articles to build a sector-
country data set. See Table A.1 for a complete description of sources for each country and 
Table A.2 for a full presentation of the data. The data set covers industries in the 
manufacturing sector defined according to the two-digit ISIC Rev.2 classification. The 
periods covered, the unit of observation (whether plant or firm) and the treatment of entry 
and exit differ across countries (see Table A.1). For the countries in which we directly 
construct the job reallocation measures we include only industries with more than 40 plants.
Log Employment 91-95 (lemp91-
95)
Average of the values of Log (number of workers) for 1991-95 at the three-digit ISIC level 
from UNIDO (2002) database.
Log Value Added  91-95 Average of the values of Log of Value Added (in US dollars) for  1991-95 at the three-digit 
ISIC level from UNIDO (2002) database. 
Log Number of Establishments Average of the values of Log of Number of Establishments for 1991-95 at the three-digit 
ISIC level from UNIDO (2002) database. 
Log Plant size  Average of the values of Log (Number of Establishments/Number of Workers) for  1991-95 
at the three-digit ISIC level from UNIDO (2002) database.
Log Labor Productivity Average of the values of Log (Value Added/Number of Workers) for period 1991-95 at the 
three-digit ISIC level from UNIDO (2002) database.
Country and Sector-Level Variables
Sector-Level Variables
Table 1 (Cont.)
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Variable Obs Mean  Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Ln(Emp) 1473 9.29 1.97 1.79 14.50
Ln (Value Added) (VA)   1471 14.78 2.61 3.63 21.39
Ln (VA / Emp) 1471 5.49 1.31 -1.03 9.52
L n ( F i r m  S i z e ) 1 4 0 84 . 1 41 . 1 00 . 3 6 8 . 2 2
 Sector Share (Emp)  1473 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.70
SUM_USA * JS Bot (MC+AC) 1473 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.38
Job Reallocation (SUM) 157 20.88 7.42 4.48 39.57
Country Averages (Time invariant)
ELPmon+EPLadm 59 0.80 0.43 0.00 1.49
EPLmon 59 0.42 0.22 0.00 0.81
EPLadm 59 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.86
Acc. Standards 40 60.83 13.55 24.00 83.00
Property Rights 59 3.92 0.87 2.50 5.00
Entry Cost (%GDPpc) 59 0.37 0.63 0.00 3.35
Rule of Law 59 0.59 1.02 -1.27 2.14
Ln (GDPpc) Avg.1985-89 59 8.15 1.58 4.96 10.35
Variable Obs Mean  Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Ln(Emp) 622 9.99 1.81 4.61 14.50
Ln (Value Added) (VA)   622 16.42 1.98 10.13 21.39
Ln (VA / Emp) 622 6.42 0.68 4.42 9.52
Ln(Firm Size) 589 3.80 0.99 1.06 7.18
 Sector Share (Emp)  622 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.61
SUM_USA * JS Bot (MC+AC) 622 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.35
Job Reallocation (SUM) 99 21.14 6.45 7.3 38.9
Country Averages (Time invariant)
ELPmon+EPLadm 25 0.74 0.41 0.08 1.40
EPLmon 25 0.39 0.21 0.00 0.69
EPLadm 25 0.35 0.26 0.00 0.86
Acc. Standards 24 66.54 9.85 36.00 83.00
Property Rights 25 4.72 0.46 4.00 5.00
Entry Cost (%GDPpc) 25 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.59
Rule of Law 25 1.63 0.43 0.74 2.14
Ln (GDPpc) Avg.1985-89 25 9.71 0.43 8.65 10.35
Table 2
Summary Statistics  
Panel B- Industrial Countries: Country - Sector  level  data  averages (1991-1995) 
Panel A - All Countries: Country - Sector  level  data  averages (1991-1995) 
Summary Statistics for  Employment, Value Added and Firm Size (in Logs) as well as Employment Share from UNIDO 
(2002) database.   SUM is the sum of job creation and job destruction at the two-digit level. SUM_USA is the average job 
reallocation rate at three-digit ISIC for the U.S. during  period  1973-1993. Also reported  averages of  country-level 
institutional variables for the set of countries for which UNIDO data is available. (See Table 1 for sources and definitions 
of all variables included in the study). EPLmon and EPLadm are  Employment Protection measures summarizing  the 
monetary and administrative costs of dismissals.   Accouting Standards measures the degree of reliability of financial 
reporting across countries.  Entry Cost measures the monetary cost of complying with entry regulations. Property Rights 
measures the extent goverments protect private property (average 1995-2006). Rule of Law measures capacity of the State 
to enforce laws.   GDPpc denotes GDP per capita and is obtained from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
(2005).  See Table 1 for definitions and sources  34
Table 2 (Continuation)
Variable Obs Mean  Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Ln(Emp) 851 8.77 1.93 1.79 14.16
Ln (Value Added) (VA)   849 13.58 2.36 3.63 19.18
Ln (VA / Emp) 849 4.81 1.25 -1.03 9.34
Ln(Firm Size) 819 4.39 1.12 0.36 8.22
 Sector Share (Emp)  851 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.70
SUM_USA * JS Bot (MC+AC) 851 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.38
Job Reallocation (SUM) 58 20.42 8.87 4.48 39.57
Country Averages (Time invariant)
ELPmon+EPLadm 34 0.84 0.44 0.00 1.49
EPLmon 34 0.44 0.22 0.00 0.81
EPLadm 34 0.40 0.30 0.00 0.86
Acc. Standards 16 52.25 14.08 24.00 76.00
Property Rights 34 3.32 0.56 2.50 5.00
Entry Cost (%GDPpc) 34 0.56 0.78 0.03 3.35
Rule of Law 34 -0.18 0.52 -1.27 1.25
Ln (GDPpc) Avg.1985-89 34 7.00 1.03 4.96 8.73
Summary Statistics:  UNIDO data base three-digit ISIC Rev.2  






















































Job  Excess job External financial Intangible to  Entry
reallocation reallocation   dependence fixed  assets rate
ISIC Manufacturing of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
353 Petroleum refineries 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.34
351 Chemicals 0.12 0.09 0.33 0.96 0.33
341 Paper 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.31
314 Tobacco 0.14 0.09 -0.45 0.49 0.21
371 Iron and Steel prod. 0.15 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.32
355 Rubber prod. 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.46 0.43
362 Glass prod. 0.15 0.11 0.53 0.05 0.34
313 Beverages 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.75 0.39
372 Non ferrous prod. 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.32
342 Printing and publishing 0.17 0.15 0.20 4.54 0.49
385 Scientific equipment 0.17 0.14 0.96 0.90 0.60
361 Pottery prod. 0.18 0.13 -0.15 0.05 0.34
311 Food 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.75 0.24
321 Textile 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.37
352 Other chemicals 0.18 0.14 0.75 0.96 0.33
384 Transport equipment 0.18 0.13 0.29 0.24 0.47
354 Petroleum and coal prod. 0.19 0.14 0.33 0.02 0.34
383 Electric machinery 0.19 0.14 0.86 0.77 0.46
382 Machinery 0.20 0.15 0.68 0.25 0.47
381 Fabricated metal prod. 0.21 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.43
332 Furniture 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.49 0.47
324 Footware 0.22 0.16 -0.08 0.33 0.29
369 Other non-metallic prod. 0.22 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.34
356 Plastic prod. 0.23 0.17 1.14 0.46 0.43
331 Wood 0.23 0.18 0.28 1.20 0.50
323 Leather 0.24 0.18 -0.14 0.33 0.29
390 Other manfuc. industries 0.24 0.20 0.47 2.29 0.40
322 Apparel 0.25 0.20 0.03 0.53 0.40
Dif. P90-p10 0.12 0.09 1.00 1.15 0.20
Dif. P75-p25 0.07 0.05 0.29 0.64 0.11
Table 3: Sector-specific Variables:  Averages for United States industries.
Sector (ISIC-rev 2)
Job Reallocation rate at three-digit SITC for the United States during  period  1973-1993.  Excess Job Reallocation is 
defined as Job Reallocation minus net job growth. External Financial Dependence is the fraction of investments in U.S. 
firms financed externally. Intangible Assets are blueprints, patents, copyrights, client lists and trademarks. Entry Rate is 
defined as the number of new firms divided by average number of firms (See Table 1 for descriptions and sources).  36
  




Canada 0.78 0.64 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Chile 0.61 0.64 0.68 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Colombia 0.75 0.76 0.43 0.77 1
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Germany 0.63 0.71 0.58 0.83 0.78 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Finland 0.52 0.11 0.38 0.17 0.53 0.11 1
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.09)
France 0.62 0.81 0.22 0.42 0.56 0.61 -0.13 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
nited Kingd 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.75 0.63 0.81 0.4 0.5 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Italy 0.77 0.9 0.69 0.57 0.55 0.77 0.18 0.7 0.91 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Mexico 0.78 0.51 0.83 0.55 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.19 0.86 0.67 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Norway 0.74 0.66 0.8 0.73 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.26 0.8 0.7 0.73 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
New Zealan 0.74 0.68 0.96 0.56 0.33 0.53 0.28 0.24 0.8 0.74 0.74 0.81 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Portugal 0.72 0.64 0.52 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.35 0.66 0.76 0.68 0.59 0.64 0.41 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sweden -0.39 0.16 -0.34 0.17 -0.11 0.17 -0.54 0.14 -0.14 -0.04 -0.28 -0.24 -0.28 -0.11 1
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
U r u g u a y 0 . 6 50 . 7 10 . 9 40 . 4 80 . 3 10 . 5 40 . 0 80 . 3 70 . 8 80 . 7 70 . 6 50 . 8 80 . 9 40 . 3 70 . 4 2 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
United State 0.69 0.71 0.94 0.73 0.39 0.7 0.12 0.34 0.87 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.94 0.53 -0.1 0.94 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
V e n e z u e l a 0 . 3 30 . 3 40 . 5 80 . 8 70 . 4 20 . 5 80 . 0 70 . 1 20 . 4 90 . 2 30 . 4 30 . 5 10 . 4 60 . 5 5 0 . 2 0 . 3 70 . 6 1 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Eng-speakin 0.8 0.71 0.98 0.77 0.52 0.7 (0.36) 0.32 0.92 0.78 0.85 0.84 0.94 0.64 -0.26 1.00 0.96 0.61
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 4
Spearman Rank Correlation of Sectoral Job Reallocation between Pairs of Countries 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients of job reallocation at the sector level (two-digit ISIC Rev2) between pairs of countries.In parenthesis the probability that the two variables are independent. All 
coefficients are estimated with either 8 or 9 observations (depending on whether information for sector 39 ISIC Rev2 is available).English-speaking denotes the unweighted average of sectoral job reallocation 
for Canada,United Kingdom, New Zealand and United States.    37




Chile 0.63 0.75 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Colombia 0.83 0.71 0.58 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
United Kingdom 0.82 0.63 0.5 0.79 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mexico 0.57 0.51 0.33 0.76 0.9 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Uruguay 0.82 0.14 0.48 0.42 0.54 0.14 1
(0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08)
United States 0.56 0.8 0.6 0.45 0.8 0.65 0.02 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73)
Venezuela 0.24 0.61 0.8 0.42 0.08 0.01 -0.08 0.12
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.82) (0.30) (0.06)
English-speaking 0.69 0.73 0.5 0.68 0.86 0.8 0.14 0.91 0.14
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.03)
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient of Sectoral Excess Correlation between Pairs of Countries
Table 5
Spearman rank correlation coefficients of excess job reallocation at the sector level (two-digit ISIC Rev2) between pairs of countries. 
In parenthesis the probability that the two variables are independent. All coefficients are estimated with either 8 or 9 observations 
(depending on whether information for sector 39 ISIC Rev2 is available).English-speaking denotes the unweighted average of sectoral 
job reallocation for United Kingdom and United States.    38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
SUM SUM SUM SUM SUM SUM SUM Log(SUM) SUM SUM SUM
SUM_USA*(EPLmon+EPLadm)  -0.689 -0.673 -0.690 -0.292 -1.037 -0.032 -0.983 -2.561 -1.507







SUM_USA*JS Bot (MC+AC)*RL -1.098 -1.512 1.389
(0.339)*** (0.772)* (2.657)
SUM_USA*RL 1.006 1.852 -2.142 -0.908
(0.244)*** (0.569)*** (2.522) (0.658)
SUM_USA*GDPpc -0.086 -0.080 -0.085 0.118 -0.002 -0.323 -0.121 0.209





Observations 148 148 157 148 148 148 149 148 58 90 90
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.94 0.80 0.80
Sample [1] [1] ALL [1] [1] [1] [2] [1] [3] [4] [4]
F test: JS Bot (MC+AC)(1+RL)=0  0.00 0.14 0.00
Diff. In Job Flows P90-P10 -6.31 -6.16 -6.06 -6.26 -6.32 -9.50 -0.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Results for job reallocation at two-digit ISIC(rev2). In addition to the variables listed in this table, all  specifications include sector and country fixed 
effects. SUM denotes job reallocation, SUM_USA denotes job reallocation  in the United States and EPLmon+EPLadm is the sum of the monetary and 
administrative cost of dismissal from Botero and others (2004). EXC_USA measures excess reallocation in the US at the sector level, while  SUM_ES 
denotes average sector gross job flows for all the English-speaking countries of our sample. ENTRY denotes the firm entry rate per sector, while ECgdp is 
the cost of entry as a % of GDP per capita. RL denotes rule of law, GDPpc denotes GDP per capita.   [1]  All countries but U.S.; [2]  All Countries but 
U.S. In  Brazil and Mexico job flows computed from manufacturing census data  (only continuous plants) instead of administrative database. [3]  Latin 
American countries, [4]  Industrial  countries with the exception of U.S. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
lemp91-95 lemp91-95 lemp91-95 lemp91-95 lemp91-95 ShE91-95 lemp86-90 lemp91-95 lemp91-95 lemp91-95
SUM_USA * (EPLmon+EPLadm).  -3.724 -6.504 -0.178 -5.498 -7.94 -6.788 -5.858
(1.324)*** (1.360)*** (0.072)** (1.350)*** (1.661)*** (2.126)*** (1.881)***
SUM_USA * EPLmon -8.617 -4.722
(2.774)*** (2.95)
SUM_USA * EPLadm -8.724 -7.548
(1.916)*** (2.051)***
SUM_USA * (EPLadm+EPLmon)* RL -0.552
(1.40)
EFD* Acc.Standards 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.001 0.025 0.037 0.013 0.029
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)* (0.005)***
IA * Property Rights 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.003 0.103 0.119 0.018 0.088
(0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.002)* (0.030)*** (0.059)** (0.06) (0.030)***
USA Entry Rate * E.Cost (%GDPpc)  -0.805 -0.835 -0.774 -0.795 -0.008 -0.843 -0.27 -0.372 -0.807
(0.220)*** (0.222)*** (0.220)*** (0.221)*** (0.01) (0.219)*** (0.27) (0.42) (0.221)***
SUM_USA * GDPpc -0.231 -0.965 -0.905 -0.839 -0.938 -0.013 -0.119 -7.853 -0.837 -0.468
(0.36) (0.435)** (0.440)** (0.433)* (0.437)** (0.02) (0.47) (1.547)*** (0.95) (0.76)
SUM_USA * RL -0.324
(1.48)
Observations 1475 1001 1001 1001 1001 1001 993 569 432 1001
Countries 59 39 39 39 39 39 39 23 16 39
Sample All All All All All All All IND Dev. All
R-squared 0.835 0.852 0.850 0.852 0.852 0.556 0.854 0.893 0.835 0.852
F test: JS Bot (AC+MC)(1+RL)=0  1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1986 1991 1991 1991
Diff. In Job.Real. P90-p10 -0.54 -0.94 -0.59 -0.89 -0.03 -0.79 -1.14 -0.98
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 7
Results for employment. Dependent Variable: Average employment (1991-1995) (lemp91-95) , average employment share (1991-1995) (ShE91-95) or Average employment (1986-
1990) (lemp86-90) at the three-digit ISIC(rev2). Independent Variables: In addition to the variables listed in this table, all specifications include country and sector fixed effects. 
SUM_USA denotes job reallocation in the U.S. at 3-digit ISIC(rev2) (time average 1973-1993). EFD is a measure of the dependence on external finance per sector based on  Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). IA is a measure of intangible to fixed asssets  per sector. Property Rights measures the degree of protection of private property across countries. ENTRY measures the 
percentage of firms less than 2 year old per sector.  EPLadm and EPLmon denote the administrative  and the monetary costs of firing workers across countries.   RL is a measure of the 
Rule of Law across countries. Acc. standards is a measure that ranks countries according to the transparency and reliability of the reporting standards in accounting. ECgdp as a fraction
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Value Added 
91-95
Log Labor 
Productivity       
91-95
Log Number of Plants    
91-95
Log Plant Size     
91-95
SUM_USA * (EPLadm+EPLmon)  -8.888 -2.386 -4.249 -2.42
(1.626)*** (0.977)** (1.510)*** (1.136)**
EFD* Acc.Standard 0.036 0.008 0.016 0.012
(0.005)*** (0.003)** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Int.Assets * Property Rights 0.101 0.014 0.065 0.024
(0.036)*** (0.02) (0.031)** (0.02)
USA ENTRY Rate * E.Cost (%GDPpc)  -0.386 0.419 -1.672 0.841
(0.26) (0.158)*** (0.232)*** (0.174)***
SUM USA * GDPpc -1.046 -0.082 -0.042 -0.991
(0.520)** (0.31) (0.46) (0.346)***
Observations 1001 1001 940 940
R-squared 0.8469 0.8214 0.8806 0.7965
Countries  39 39 36 36
Diff. In Job.Real. P90-p10 -1.28 -0.34 -0.61 -0.35
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In addition to the variables included in this table, each specification includes country and sector fixed-effects.  SUM_USA 
denotes job reallocation at three-digit ISIC(Rev2) for the U.S. (average 1973-1993). EFD denotes External Financial 
Dependence at the sector level. Int. Assets denotes Intangible to Fixed Assets ratio. ENTRY denotes entry rate of new 
firms in each sector  EPLadm and EPLmon denotes the sum of the two EPL indices constructed by Botero and others 
(2004) ECgdp denotes entry cost as a fraction of GDPpc.  GDPpc denotes the average GDP per capita  in period 1986-
1990.  See additional information on definitions and sources in Table 1. 
The effects of Employment Protection Laws on Value Added, Labor Productivity,  Number of Plants and 
Employment per Plant
Table 8